Derrida’s discussion of how “justice, as law, is never exercised without a decision” reminds me a lot of Kierkegaard’s knight of infinite resignation. In fact, he even quotes Kierkegaard during this part of his talk: “The instant of decision is a madness.” His investigation here was helpful in further understanding the post-structuralist’s conception of freedom. However, I would still be hard pressed to give a detailed account of how it exactly differs from the existentialist’s conception.
I was able to follow most of Derrida’s deconstruction of Pascal. However, I’m not entirely clear on what he arrived at as the “mystical.” What is Derrida’s conception of the mystical here? Is it this moment of the founding of law that he sees as impossible yet possible (and related to the instant of decision)? If this is the case, I think I understand why Derrida asserts that “the fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news.” We can constantly “reinstitute” justice.
I think the practice of law itself proves Derrida's point about the deconstructive nature of the law in that the contradictions between the words used in the writing of the laws can be used to generate new meanings and interpretations of the laws. Lawyers wouldn't be able to present so many different interpretations of the same law and apply whichever interpretation will get their client in the least amount of trouble if this weren't the case.
Derrida's avant-garde writing style and the differences between what he states he is doing and what he is actually doing became apparent to me in this reading as he would drone on for a while talking about the topic while not really addressing it. For instance, on page 16 he says "And so I must address myself to you and 'address' problems, I must do it briefly and in a foreign language. To do it briefly, I ought to do it as directly as possible, going straight ahead, without detour, without historical alibi, without obliqueness, toward you, supposedly the primary addressees of this discourse, but at the same time toward the place of essential decision for said problems," and then he talks about the word address for a while.
This is a good example of his deconstruction style that you were explaing last class. He uses arguments to break down the institutions of law and education we see in this country. As he says in a highly tecnologically adcanced society educations becomes our guidlines. Especially Law school. I like how he uses philosophy to deconstruct and then uses critial evalution on legal studies.
When I read what Derrida is saying about power as it relates to law and justice, I find my intuition largely in agreement. I think law does not need to have anything to do with justice. Laws come from sources of power. He talks about the translations of kinds of power in English, French, and German, and I am getting the feeling he prefers the German because it has a nuance of balance. Derrida doesn’t appear to want to think of justice or power as s metaphysical virtue but he also seems against a sort of relativistic “law” that primarily serves the powerful.
His assessment that law serves the dominant power and is performative is interesting, especially when it is compared to Justice which he appears to argue exists for itself. If law is servile and justice is free, then we must live in a sort of hybrid society, where we make laws in an attempt to achieve justice. I wonder where Derrida thinks the ideal place on this spectrum is.
Derrida is unpacking how language can influence on concept. He uses "to enforce the law," as an example. This example shows that law does not necessarily mean "how it is", as it does when talking about things such as "laws of nature", which are immediate and don't require reinforcement. Laws of justice have no natural force to them, they require human intervention. The idiom "to enforce the law," is a reminder that the law is not natural, it needs enforcement to exist.
Derrida also expresses interest in the idiom "to address." It made me consider what could be so attractive in that set of words. I think it's that it assigns a subject to some sort of identifiable key. To address something is to give it attention, acknowledge a concept, and and provide a way for other to find this same object. Without addressing, no two people could have the same object in their context.
The part of the reading where Derrida talks about the relation fo power to justice and law is interesting to me. It is very true that power determines justice and law. Whomever is in power hets to decide laws and consequences for breaking them. This truth makes it so that justice is subjective and is determined by whomever is in power.
The title mystical foundation of authority leads me to believe that Derrida believes the idea of authority is mystical in its mystery. The idea that every leader determines rules is somewhat strange in that they basically decide how their domain is run. they can create rules that a completely ludicrous but they must be followed.
I find Derrida's annihilation of the meta-narratives of power to in a large part align with my own view of reality. Furthermore I really enjoy the distinction he makes between the law and justice; postulating that while the law is always subject to dismantling on the grounds of the rejection of meta-natives justice itself is not. This is because in Derrida's view deconstruction is justice.
Though out history there have been countless examples of horrors that have occurred only because they were seen as justifiable for the completion of some sort of master idea. The 9/11 Hijackers for instance were only motivated by the goal of the completion of a meta-narrative, so were the fascists and the Stalinists. However my real question is how can one integrate neo-marxian and post-structuralist thought? Perhaps it is best done through the acceptance that there is no final philosophy but rather for as long as there is intelligent life there will be an ever ongoing flow of knowledge production. This means that one can negate the totalitarian impulse of 'final philosophy' while still having a society dedicated to knowledge production. Perhaps we ought to change our working definition of utopia from one that includes a completion or final knowledge, to one that admits that it can do no such thing.
Derrida’s discussion of how “justice, as law, is never exercised without a decision” reminds me a lot of Kierkegaard’s knight of infinite resignation. In fact, he even quotes Kierkegaard during this part of his talk: “The instant of decision is a madness.” His investigation here was helpful in further understanding the post-structuralist’s conception of freedom. However, I would still be hard pressed to give a detailed account of how it exactly differs from the existentialist’s conception.
ReplyDeleteI was able to follow most of Derrida’s deconstruction of Pascal. However, I’m not entirely clear on what he arrived at as the “mystical.” What is Derrida’s conception of the mystical here? Is it this moment of the founding of law that he sees as impossible yet possible (and related to the instant of decision)? If this is the case, I think I understand why Derrida asserts that “the fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news.” We can constantly “reinstitute” justice.
I think the practice of law itself proves Derrida's point about the deconstructive nature of the law in that the contradictions between the words used in the writing of the laws can be used to generate new meanings and interpretations of the laws. Lawyers wouldn't be able to present so many different interpretations of the same law and apply whichever interpretation will get their client in the least amount of trouble if this weren't the case.
ReplyDeleteDerrida's avant-garde writing style and the differences between what he states he is doing and what he is actually doing became apparent to me in this reading as he would drone on for a while talking about the topic while not really addressing it. For instance, on page 16 he says "And so I must address myself to you and 'address' problems, I must do it briefly and in a foreign language. To do it briefly, I ought to do it as directly as possible, going straight ahead, without detour, without historical alibi, without obliqueness, toward you, supposedly the primary addressees of this discourse, but at the same time toward the place of essential decision for said problems," and then he talks about the word address for a while.
This is a good example of his deconstruction style that you were explaing last class. He uses arguments to break down the institutions of law and education we see in this country. As he says in a highly tecnologically adcanced society educations becomes our guidlines. Especially Law school. I like how he uses philosophy to deconstruct and then uses critial evalution on legal studies.
ReplyDeleteWhen I read what Derrida is saying about power as it relates to law and justice, I find my intuition largely in agreement. I think law does not need to have anything to do with justice. Laws come from sources of power. He talks about the translations of kinds of power in English, French, and German, and I am getting the feeling he prefers the German because it has a nuance of balance. Derrida doesn’t appear to want to think of justice or power as s metaphysical virtue but he also seems against a sort of relativistic “law” that primarily serves the powerful.
ReplyDeleteHis assessment that law serves the dominant power and is performative is interesting, especially when it is compared to Justice which he appears to argue exists for itself. If law is servile and justice is free, then we must live in a sort of hybrid society, where we make laws in an attempt to achieve justice. I wonder where Derrida thinks the ideal place on this spectrum is.
Derrida is unpacking how language can influence on concept. He uses "to enforce the law," as an example. This example shows that law does not necessarily mean "how it is", as it does when talking about things such as "laws of nature", which are immediate and don't require reinforcement. Laws of justice have no natural force to them, they require human intervention. The idiom "to enforce the law," is a reminder that the law is not natural, it needs enforcement to exist.
ReplyDeleteDerrida also expresses interest in the idiom "to address." It made me consider what could be so attractive in that set of words. I think it's that it assigns a subject to some sort of identifiable key. To address something is to give it attention, acknowledge a concept, and and provide a way for other to find this same object. Without addressing, no two people could have the same object in their context.
The part of the reading where Derrida talks about the relation fo power to justice and law is interesting to me. It is very true that power determines justice and law. Whomever is in power hets to decide laws and consequences for breaking them. This truth makes it so that justice is subjective and is determined by whomever is in power.
ReplyDeleteThe title mystical foundation of authority leads me to believe that Derrida believes the idea of authority is mystical in its mystery. The idea that every leader determines rules is somewhat strange in that they basically decide how their domain is run. they can create rules that a completely ludicrous but they must be followed.
I find Derrida's annihilation of the meta-narratives of power to in a large part align with my own view of reality. Furthermore I really enjoy the distinction he makes between the law and justice; postulating that while the law is always subject to dismantling on the grounds of the rejection of meta-natives justice itself is not. This is because in Derrida's view deconstruction is justice.
ReplyDeleteThough out history there have been countless examples of horrors that have occurred only because they were seen as justifiable for the completion of some sort of master idea. The 9/11 Hijackers for instance were only motivated by the goal of the completion of a meta-narrative, so were the fascists and the Stalinists. However my real question is how can one integrate neo-marxian and post-structuralist thought? Perhaps it is best done through the acceptance that there is no final philosophy but rather for as long as there is intelligent life there will be an ever ongoing flow of knowledge production. This means that one can negate the totalitarian impulse of 'final philosophy' while still having a society dedicated to knowledge production. Perhaps we ought to change our working definition of utopia from one that includes a completion or final knowledge, to one that admits that it can do no such thing.