I understand that for the theory of intentionality there is a “difference between the act, the meaning, and the object.” However, I’m slightly confused by where the ideas of intentional quality and intentional matter fit into this.
I am also a little confused when Zahavi states that, “intentionality does not presuppose the existence of two different entities–consciousness and the object. All that is needed for intentionality to occur is the existence of an experience with the appropriate internal structure of object-directedness.” Is he Zahavi saying that consciousness does not exist independently of its intended object? I also assumed that intentionality, in fact, suggests that there are two different entities, the conscious act and the intended object.
1) How he discusses the true meaning of consciousness then goes onto say how he does not care what the true meaning of consciousness is. 2) I found the reference to a unicorn interesting, because all though philosophical perspectives are supposed to be creative they are not supposed to be unrealistic. So having husserl tell his readers to imagine a unicorn, is interesting.
I largely agree with Husserl’s arguments as Zahavi puts them, and I see the flaws in the view that action influences the intentionality of an object, as well as the flaws in the idea that an objects capacity to be fictional deprive it of intentionality. Both of these theories are clearly flawed to me, much as they were to Husserl.
I am not certain why Husserl would not choose to distinguish between real objects and the intentional. That is to say, I follow that intention of an unreal object does not require the object to exist, only the subject of observation. But in the case that the both the subject of observation and the object really exist, I don’t agree with how Husserl can disregard the idea that an intentional object can exist alongside the real object. Maybe this distinction could be cleared up by considering that the object (in the case that it really exists) can, in return, have causal influence on the subject?
According to Zahavi, Husserl believes that intended unreal objects are just as much characterized by their directedness toward a transcendent object as are normal perceptions. Would Husserl argue that it's therefore impossible to imagine an object that spawns purely from imagination and has no basis in the real world?
I am slightly confused about Husserl's arguments against the representative theory of perception.
i can see shades of Descartes within Husserl's theory of intentionality. By putting so much emphasis on the consciousness he's providing an updated version of Descartes's famous proclamation.
The similarities to Plato in the latter half of the reading are very apparent. I like the updated theory of forms whereby, instead of there being a higher realm of concepts and objects, we construct them ourselves through experience and our relation to them.
Husserls philosophy, more precisely, his distinction between formal and material ontology reeks of Descartes’s dualism. I’m curious why he has to postulate two different Realms of ontology and not just one, fundemtnal ontology. Perhaps this thought is the bais of my own mind, even though I am an atheist I can not deny that I was raised within the context of a monotheistic tradition.
That being said I quite liked his thoughts on knowledge, specifically knowledge as synthesis “knowledge can be characterized as identification with or synthesis between that which is intended and that which is given, and truth as an identity between the meant and the given”
One thing I found note worthy in the reading was the fact that Husserl claims he does not care about the true meaning of consciousness, yet he seems to put so much emphasis on what it means in his writing.
This also reminded me of Descartes and claims he had made in the past, almost as if Husserl was modeling his work after that, or building off of it.
The assessment of phenomenology, as a faithful description of that which is appears, I think fits with the rest Husserl's philosophy. There is a large emphasis on perception, such as when he asserts that consciousness requires a developed brain and sensory organs, as they are necessary for perception.
His phenomenology seems challenged by the idea of the impossible object. That is, most objects we claim to be impossible are combinations of real objects we have perceived before.
I found Husserl outlook on the world was so different from what people typically think. Husserl take on the difference between excremental and intramental objects was fascinating to me. Essentially, Husserl believes that objects we see are essentially nonexistant until we internalize them in a way that is comfortable for our mind to understand.
Another interesting topic mentioned by Husserl is that sight does not really mean anything. Anything we see is important only by the way we internalize it. Love is only vital by feeling it and fear is only crucial when we are actually fearful.
I understand that for the theory of intentionality there is a “difference between the act, the meaning, and the object.” However, I’m slightly confused by where the ideas of intentional quality and intentional matter fit into this.
ReplyDeleteI am also a little confused when Zahavi states that, “intentionality does not presuppose the existence of two different entities–consciousness and the object. All that is needed for intentionality to occur is the existence of an experience with the appropriate internal structure of object-directedness.” Is he Zahavi saying that consciousness does not exist independently of its intended object? I also assumed that intentionality, in fact, suggests that there are two different entities, the conscious act and the intended object.
1) How he discusses the true meaning of consciousness then goes onto say how he does not care what the true meaning of consciousness is.
ReplyDelete2) I found the reference to a unicorn interesting, because all though philosophical perspectives are supposed to be creative they are not supposed to be unrealistic. So having husserl tell his readers to imagine a unicorn, is interesting.
I largely agree with Husserl’s arguments as Zahavi puts them, and I see the flaws in the view that action influences the intentionality of an object, as well as the flaws in the idea that an objects capacity to be fictional deprive it of intentionality. Both of these theories are clearly flawed to me, much as they were to Husserl.
ReplyDeleteI am not certain why Husserl would not choose to distinguish between real objects and the intentional. That is to say, I follow that intention of an unreal object does not require the object to exist, only the subject of observation. But in the case that the both the subject of observation and the object really exist, I don’t agree with how Husserl can disregard the idea that an intentional object can exist alongside the real object. Maybe this distinction could be cleared up by considering that the object (in the case that it really exists) can, in return, have causal influence on the subject?
According to Zahavi, Husserl believes that intended unreal objects are just as much characterized by their directedness toward a transcendent object as are normal perceptions. Would Husserl argue that it's therefore impossible to imagine an object that spawns purely from imagination and has no basis in the real world?
ReplyDeleteI am slightly confused about Husserl's arguments against the representative theory of perception.
i can see shades of Descartes within Husserl's theory of intentionality. By putting so much emphasis on the consciousness he's providing an updated version of Descartes's famous proclamation.
ReplyDeleteThe similarities to Plato in the latter half of the reading are very apparent. I like the updated theory of forms whereby, instead of there being a higher realm of concepts and objects, we construct them ourselves through experience and our relation to them.
Husserls philosophy, more precisely, his distinction between formal and material ontology reeks of Descartes’s dualism. I’m curious why he has to postulate two different Realms of ontology and not just one, fundemtnal ontology. Perhaps this thought is the bais of my own mind, even though I am an atheist I can not deny that I was raised within the context of a monotheistic tradition.
ReplyDeleteThat being said I quite liked his thoughts on knowledge, specifically knowledge as synthesis “knowledge can be characterized as identification with or synthesis between that which is intended and that which is given, and truth as an identity between the meant and the given”
One thing I found note worthy in the reading was the fact that Husserl claims he does not care about the true meaning of consciousness, yet he seems to put so much emphasis on what it means in his writing.
ReplyDeleteThis also reminded me of Descartes and claims he had made in the past, almost as if Husserl was modeling his work after that, or building off of it.
The assessment of phenomenology, as a faithful description of that which is appears, I think fits with the rest Husserl's philosophy. There is a large emphasis on perception, such as when he asserts that consciousness requires a developed brain and sensory organs, as they are necessary for perception.
ReplyDeleteHis phenomenology seems challenged by the idea of the impossible object. That is, most objects we claim to be impossible are combinations of real objects we have perceived before.
I found Husserl outlook on the world was so different from what people typically think. Husserl take on the difference between excremental and intramental objects was fascinating to me. Essentially, Husserl believes that objects we see are essentially nonexistant until we internalize them in a way that is comfortable for our mind to understand.
ReplyDeleteAnother interesting topic mentioned by Husserl is that sight does not really mean anything. Anything we see is important only by the way we internalize it. Love is only vital by feeling it and fear is only crucial when we are actually fearful.