On page 30 Zahavi states that Husserl “does not violate the principle of existence-independence that was earlier emphasized as a central feature of intentionality”. What does he mean by the principle of existence-independence? Is this just referring to the metaphysical neutrality of Husserl’s intentionality?
Where does the mode of giveness fall into the structure of intentionality? Zahavi states that it goes beyond the “quality-matter dyad”.
1. "...Instead of focusing on the fullness or emptiness one can focus on the absence or presence of an object?" Aren't fullness and emptiness related with absence and presence? 2. No intentional experience can lack matter? I feel as though unintentional experiences have more to interrupt and to think about because they are unintentional and there is unknown reason to those events happening to the experiencer.
1. Im having a hard time firguring out the concrete difference between imaging my notebook being blue if it is in my sight and not in my sight. Saying that its an empty intention if the book is not infront of me seems rather vague. If it is infront of me or not wouldnt i know the difference if ive ever seen seen it before?
2. I also dont understand how finding my notebook would switch my intention, the note book has been the same color the entire time. Saying its empty is confusing when i know logically it has never changed.
Last time I had reacted to the current reading; so in order to supplement that I will do the previous assignment. Husserl is not is not wrong in his critique of empirical phenomena as not stable due to falibility. However if philosophy is to become a rigorous science as he would like it to be, it would have to then be subject to the same falibility that is true of the naturalism he is reacting against.
Husserls idea of intentionality is interesting however I have a problem with his desire to create a tracendantal object. Is account of the phenomenon itself makes complete sense, after all as I type this I see a ‘phone’ and not it’s raw material such-ness. However I doubt that this (the supposedly transcendent object) ever leaves material reality.
In the reading, I am hesitant to accept being as nothing more than one of the “modes of givenness.” I can see how this is helpful phenomenologically, as Husserl clarifies the annoying distinction between an object that is only imagined and an object that actually exists but is also at present being imagines. But it seems to me that the concept of being is not as “naive” as Zahavi implies Husserl believes it is, especially if Husserl wishes to breeze past epistemological and metaphysical questions in order to better address phenomenological experience.
I am a fan of Husserl’s distinction between types of evidence, and I believe he is on the right track when he notes that different “domains’ hold different demands for evidence as the highest form of evidence may not always be possible. I think this is more fitting with Husserl’s tendency to skip the epistemology. Under Husserl’s theory, it seems possible for one to be a conservative skeptic and still agree with Husserl’s phenomenology. The experience he talks about is not contingent on absolute evidence/knowledge, but is does require the best evidence/knowledge available.
On page 30 Zahavi states that Husserl “does not violate the principle of existence-independence that was earlier emphasized as a central feature of intentionality”. What does he mean by the principle of existence-independence? Is this just referring to the metaphysical neutrality of Husserl’s intentionality?
ReplyDeleteWhere does the mode of giveness fall into the structure of intentionality? Zahavi states that it goes beyond the “quality-matter dyad”.
1. "...Instead of focusing on the fullness or emptiness one can focus on the absence or presence of an object?" Aren't fullness and emptiness related with absence and presence?
ReplyDelete2. No intentional experience can lack matter? I feel as though unintentional experiences have more to interrupt and to think about because they are unintentional and there is unknown reason to those events happening to the experiencer.
1. Im having a hard time firguring out the concrete difference between imaging my notebook being blue if it is in my sight and not in my sight. Saying that its an empty intention if the book is not infront of me seems rather vague. If it is infront of me or not wouldnt i know the difference if ive ever seen seen it before?
ReplyDelete2. I also dont understand how finding my notebook would switch my intention, the note book has been the same color the entire time. Saying its empty is confusing when i know logically it has never changed.
Last time I had reacted to the current reading; so in order to supplement that I will do the previous assignment.
ReplyDeleteHusserl is not is not wrong in his critique of empirical phenomena as not stable due to falibility. However if philosophy is to become a rigorous science as he would like it to be, it would have to then be subject to the same falibility that is true of the naturalism he is reacting against.
Husserls idea of intentionality is interesting however I have a problem with his desire to create a tracendantal object. Is account of the phenomenon itself makes complete sense, after all as I type this I see a ‘phone’ and not it’s raw material such-ness. However I doubt that this (the supposedly transcendent object) ever leaves material reality.
In the reading, I am hesitant to accept being as nothing more than one of the “modes of givenness.” I can see how this is helpful phenomenologically, as Husserl clarifies the annoying distinction between an object that is only imagined and an object that actually exists but is also at present being imagines. But it seems to me that the concept of being is not as “naive” as Zahavi implies Husserl believes it is, especially if Husserl wishes to breeze past epistemological and metaphysical questions in order to better address phenomenological experience.
ReplyDeleteI am a fan of Husserl’s distinction between types of evidence, and I believe he is on the right track when he notes that different “domains’ hold different demands for evidence as the highest form of evidence may not always be possible. I think this is more fitting with Husserl’s tendency to skip the epistemology. Under Husserl’s theory, it seems possible for one to be a conservative skeptic and still agree with Husserl’s phenomenology. The experience he talks about is not contingent on absolute evidence/knowledge, but is does require the best evidence/knowledge available.